When the Axios news of US President Trump’s phone call with the leaders of two major political parties broke today, it was met with utter silence from major Kurdish local outlets. There was a reason behind their refrain from further publicizing the event: distance and denial. Further publication and dissemination of the news would have given validity to a report that was viewed as a public outing.
The timing of the report drew criticism from pro-Kurdish news and content platforms. Some experts questioned the timing of the “leak,” while some analysts drew conclusions that this unsourced information was a sign that President Trump was not successful in convincing the two leaders to execute his plan. Others went beyond mere analysis, using creativity in imagining the nature of the request by the US President.
I am not questioning the validity of any of the aforementioned statements. Being familiar with the culture of politics in Washington, DC, I do want to take the leap of faith and make the assumption that this US government official who spoke under the condition of anonymity has had a green light to quietly whisper in the right ears. Based on that educated assumption, I would like to set the stage for the dilemma that Kurdish leaders in the Kurdistan region of Iraq find themselves in.
Crisis of Trust
While the US-Kurdish history is riddled with examples of uncertainty in the nature of the relationship going back to the 1970s, I will focus on two examples in the past decade that highlight the nature of the relationship between Kurds and the US administrations under President Trump.
In December 2018, Trump unilaterally decided to withdraw 2000 to 2500 US troops who were stationed in Syria as part of the US-led coalition fighting ISIS. These troops were stationed in Northeastern Syria, a region known to Kurds as Rojava (in reference to West Kurdistan), and had been working shoulder to shoulder with the local regional authority, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in combating the threat of proliferation of radical Islamic ideology espoused by the Islamic State. The decision came as a big surprise to most observers and hit the Kurdish community hard, as they considered it an irresponsible act of feeding their partners, the SDF, to the wolves. SDF was in control of the prisons that housed thousands of imprisoned ISIS fighters and their families, which included citizens of European countries.
Under advisement from his military, fearing the creation of a security vacuum that could be filled by terrorists, and in response to the outcry from the international community and Kurdish communities across the world, President Trump modified his decision and decided some 400 US troops would stay behind in Syria. This contingency remained in Syria through the fall of the Assad regime and continued to work closely with the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria led by the SDF.
Fast forward to January of this year, 2026. After a full year in office, the unelected president of Syria, Ahmad Al-Sharaa, began his overtures to expand his authority to the enclave long governed by the SDF. Following the sectarian clashes between his forces and the Druze and Christians in various areas across Syria, he began eyeing the majority Kurdish-populated areas in the northeastern part of the country. He was emboldened by the support he was receiving from the newly designated US Special Envoy to Syria and Lebanon, Tom Barrack. Initially Sharaa promised the integration of the SDF into the ranks of the Syrian military, granting self-rule to the SDF in its area. He later rescinded his offer and demanded full control of the region previously ruled by the SDF.
It was at this critical juncture that Tom Barrack facilitated a major shift in US foreign policy by completely sidelining the SDF and pivoting to Damascus after framing the SDF’s role as an anti-ISIS group as having “largely expired.” This move drew wide criticism from Kurds around the world and generated a popular movement of demonstrations in major Kurdish cities, world capitals, and even on social media platforms demanding that the US stand by its Kurdish allies in Syria. The US was reminded through official and public channels of their obligation to the Kurdish people and the SDF, their only ally in Syria against ISIS.
What to Do Now?
These fresh memories of the US’s vague stances and lack of long- and short-term commitments must be on the minds of the Kurdish leadership, both in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and those of the Kurdish opposition groups from Iran, who are mostly based in the KRI. What are the guarantees that the Trump administration offers to lure Kurds, once again, into a bloody battle with no clear endgame and no clearly defined gains for them? Had the US government had a better track record of honoring its promises and keeping its relationship with Kurds as true partners, not as a force to be summoned when needed, the alignment with the US’s goals and objectives would have been more palatable. Do Kurds have the option to refrain from parenting and aligning with the US’s plan? Or would they be damned if they do and damned if they don’t? Or would this be yet another lesson that they will not learn from?